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Abstract 
This study investigates the extent of use of treasury bills and central bank bills as monetary policy instrument by level of 
development of countries, and problems caused from using two securities simultaneously. Very interestingly, it is observed that 
advanced countries tend to have either treasury bills or central bank bills while less advanced countries use both bills. Also the 
advanced countries are discovered to use more treasury bills than central bank bills. It is also found that employment of two 
securities leads to bond market segmentation, profit deterioration of central bank, and increase of government debt. Based on 
these problems caused by using two bills simultaneously, I suggest that central bank bills should be integrated into treasury bills 
in those countries in which two bills are used at the same time. As for the integration, I recommend that maturity of two bills 
need to be adjusted before long, resulting in short- and long-term for treasury securities and mid-term for central bank bills.  
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1. Introduction 
One of the most important functions of a central bank is to stabilize prices through monetary policy. Therefore, a 
central bank issues either treasury bills on behalf of the government or its own central bank bills. However, most 
central banks of developed countries which own well established government bond markets employ treasury bills 
rather than their own securities as financial instrument for monetary policy. In the meantime, central bank bills are 
mainly used in developing countries such as China, Indonesia, and Chile.  
In most cases, treasury bills are issued by governments through their central banks to resolve temporarily 
insufficient budget. Yet, treasury bills are also employed as one of open market operations (OMO) forms for 
monetary policy. Hence, by issuing treasury bills, central banks can raise short-term fund for governments and 
absorb surplus liquidity from financial markets simultaneously. For that reason, financial market participants are 
more likely to be confused when treasury bills are issued with unclear or mixed objectives. Issuance of treasury bills 
for the purpose of raising fund for governments may lead to unintended liquidity drain. In this case, an essential 
function of central banks, that is, price stabilization for monetary policy may be destroyed.  
On the contrary, central banks are likely to issue their own securities in some countries in which government 
securities are insufficient. If governments are reluctant to issue treasury securities beyond budged deficit, central 
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Banks may lack financial instruments required for open market operations. In addition, central banks use own bills 
for operational flexibility in monetary operations or for separation of monetary management from debt management. 
However, excessive issuances of central bank bills may incur loss and infringe on autonomy of central banks.  
Therefore, this study examines by country issuing types of either treasury or central bank bills for monetary 
policy, and analyzes the extent of using two bills by level of development of those countries. I also investigate some 
countries where treasury securities and central bank bills are employed at the same time, and identify problems 
caused by using two securities. This paper suggests that maturity of two bills need to be adjusted in a short term and 
should be eventually integrated.  
2. Monetary policy instruments 
Central banks generally perform the issuance of treasury and central bank bills for monetary policy in three types. 
First of all, central banks issue only treasury bills. The central banks issue bills classified by objective: bills for 
government funds and bills for monetary policy. Bills for government funds have relatively short-term maturity, e.g. 
one month or less. For instance, the United States issues two-week bills, named ‘cash management bills’. Brazil also 
distinguishes cash management bills with short-term maturity from conventional treasury bills. New Zealand issues 
treasury bills with non-standard maturities matched to the days when cash is expected to flow in.  
Secondly, central banks issue central bank bills instead of treasury bills for monetary policy to properly function. 
Most central banks that issue central bank bills directly lend fund to the government when it suffers budget deficit. 
That is, central banks use central bank bills as monetary policy instrument while they finance funds for government 
on a temporary basis. Monetary stabilization bond (MSB) issued by the Bank of Korea is an example of central bank 
bills.  
Thirdly, central banks issue not only treasury bills but central bank bills. Central banks enforce monetary policy 
involuntarily and automatically by using treasury bills, and do it intentionally and deliberately by using central bank 
bills as well. In case of the two treasury- and central bank bills issuance, it is more likely to bring on several 
problems including market segmentation. The problems on the two different government bills and central bank bills 
are explained later in more details.        
3. Use of bills by level of countries’ development 
Very interestingly, it is observed that advanced countries tend to have either treasury bills or central bank bills 
while less advanced countries use both bills. According to the survey by Information System Instruments of 
Monetary Policy (ISIMP) of IMF on 84 countries as of 2008, 31% of developing countries and 41% of emerging 
market countries employ treasury bills and central bank bills simultaneously whereas there is no developed country 
using both types of bills1. In addition, developed countries make more use of treasury bills while emerging market 
countries use central bank bills more as in Figure 1. It is interpreted that central banks in developing or emerging 
market countries end up in issuing own bills because their governments are reluctant to issue treasury bills for 
liquidity management. 
Some countries even alter the bill type from central bank bills to treasury bills as the national economy develops. 
In Brazil, the treasury and the central bank issued their own bills until May 2002. However, the central bank stopped 
doing so to develop its domestic Treasury bond market. Instead, the treasury started issuing equivalent amount of 
treasury securities when the outstanding central bank bills expired. Meanwhile, in general the number of countries 
using treasury bills is almost same as that of countries using central bank bills.  
In terms of maturity of central bank bills, most countries have one year maturity. The bills’ maturity also shows 
different characteristics depending on the country’s development so that the more developed counties present shorter 
maturity. For instance, the Bank of Poland even issues central bank bills with only seven day-maturity. 
 
1 Nyawata(2012) summarizes the results of the 2008 survey. 
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4. Treasury bills vs. Central bank bills 
Debates on which bills are more effective for monetary policy have long been continuous in academia and 
practice. However, it comes to conclusion that the use of treasury bills needs to take priority over the use of central 
bank bills because the issuance of own bills is more likely to harm the independency of central bank in the 
performance of monetary policy. Namely, potential deterioration of central bank profit caused by issuing own bills 
results in financial support from government. Others reasons for using treasury bills prior to central bank bills are 
that it provides comprehensive sight with respect to public finance sector, contributes to development of short-term 
bond market, and creates brand new financial instruments based on treasury bills. Cho (2011) also explains the 
advantage in use of treasury bills that they can make daily liquidity management more easily, reduce volatility of 
short-term interest rate affecting the entire financial market, and apply money market instruments to be fine-tuning 
for liquidity. Therefore, advanced countries enforce monetary policy through treasury bills, which play a major role 
in monetary market.  
Nevertheless, the reason that some countries employ central bank bills is traced on development process of 
national economy. Most countries deliberately injected liquidity into the banking system to invigorate the transition 
process from centrally planned economies to free market. However, increased foreign exchange inflows and 
expanded loan portfolios of banks generated excessive liquidity which the countries need to absorb by open market 
operation. Under the circumstances, governments were less motivated to issue sufficient treasury bills due to 
concerns of too high fiscal surpluses. It implies that central bank bills are more popular in developing countries 
rather than in advanced countries. 
In combined use of two bills, the decision on priority of bill issuance basically depends on independence and 
autonomy of central banks. It is possible to issue central bank bills first if central banks can satisfy concreteness and 
transparency to embark on bills issuance, maintain enough financial health to pay operating cost and loss, and 
clearly regulate on earning distributions and capital rising. The decision on selection of priority bills can be also 
affected by degree of monetary market development. Central bank bills tend to be issued in countries where 
Treasury bill market is shallow. In addition, how easily the central banks perform monetary policy and how willfully 
the monetary market develops influence the decision on which bills to be issued first.  
Meanwhile, it is necessary for the treasury and the central bank to build up cooperation and to share information 
on issuing bills for financial stability on monetary market. Santoro (2012) indicates that supplementary financing 
program (SFP) at the request of the Federal Reserve is very useful to drain surplus reserves caused by large fund 
provision subsequent to the global financial crisis. The Federal Reserve sold treasury bills for SEP2. Cookie man 
(2011) also insists that the cooperation between two entities was one of the key factors to overcome the global 
financial crisis. Moser-Boehm (2006) finds that advanced countries have more meetings in several levels between 
the government and the central bank than emerging market countries do.  
5. Problems caused by issuance of two bills  
Simultaneous issuance of treasury bills and central bank bills bring on several problems in terms of bond market, 
profit of central bank, and national debt. Above all, fragmentation in bond market causes most concern. If two bills 
with same maturity present different yield curve, it could cause liquidity shortage and price distortion. It is estimated 
that such fragmentation in bond market tends to intensify when maturity of two bills is likely to be identical.  
For instance, figure 2 displays actual yield curves of Treasury bond and central bank bond as of December 2007 
and April 2008 in Korea. According to figure 2, interest rates of treasury bonds issued by government and of MSBs 
issued by central bank appear differently in spite of identical time-to-maturity of two securities. The yields of the 
two securities with one year maturity are same, but the yield of two years on MSB is higher than that on T-bond as 
of December 2007. In addition, two year-MSB presents a higher interest rate than even three year T-bond. Moreover, 
 
2 Cecchetti (2009) emphasizes the importance of liquidity provision role from central bank in early stage of financial crisis. 










the yield curves as of April 2008 show serious distortion of interest rate. The yields on MSBs rise as maturity 
becomes longer whereas the yields on T-bonds fall until the maturity of three years followed by interest rate reversal 
of short- and long-term, resulting in opposite direction of yields between MSBs and T-bonds. It implies that the term 
structure of interest rates is not reasonably formed. Unequal interest rates between T-bonds and MSBs issued by 
entities whose credit rate is identical make it difficult to perform benchmark to settle interest rates of corporate or 
other bonds. Such unstable benchmark interest rate plays a role as one of risk factors to establish issuing interest rate 















Figure 1. Interest rate on maturities of T-bonds and MSBs 
Source: The Bank of Korea 
 
Second, the excessive issuance of central bank bills can lead to worsening of central bank profit. The increase of 
debt of central bank caused by issuing its own securities could adversely affect the financial soundness of it. The 
interest payment from issuing central bank bills could be followed by the increase in cost. In addition, a huge 
amount of interest due to the excessive issuance of central bank bills causes increased money supply, which is more 
likely to impede operational efficiency of monetary policy and monetary management.  
Third, the increases in the issuance of central bank securities can eventually lead to a growth in the potential 
national debt. The increased interest expense caused by expansion of central bank bills balance may result in fiscal 
burden on the government. When central bank makes deficit, the bank makes it up by using its reserve. However, if 
the reserve is exhausted, then it is subject to replenishment funds by the government. Such fund provision by 
government implies that the issuance costs of central bank bills tend to be of quasi-fiscal characteristic, which is 
eventually counted in as potential national debt. Moreover, such arguments will become stronger because central 
bank bills are likely to be included in the national debt based on the recent standardized definition of the national 
debt by the IMF. 
6. Policy Implications 
We have examined pros and cons of the issuance of government bills and central bank bills for monetary policy 
and frequencies in use of two bills depending on the stage of national development. In some countries where two 
bills are issued at the same time, the integration of treasury bonds and central bank bonds may be inevitable to 
comprehensively consider the appropriate monetary management instrument. It is also crucial to develop the 
government bond market, solve the illiquidity and distorted term structure on bond market, and secure autonomy of 
the central bank for those countries. In order to minimize the side effects that may occur due to complete integration 
of these bonds, however, we need to establish strategies for win-win in short-term and integration in long-term.  
For the win-win in short-term, it is first priority to adjust the maturity of two securities. Central bank bonds 
should be reshaped to issue mainly mid-term, whereas treasury securities should focus on issuing short-term with 
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less than one year maturity and issuing long-term with more than three year maturity. In other words, bond market 
should be segmented into treasury bills for short-term, MSBs for mid-term, and treasury bond for long-term 
respectively to avoid the maturity duplication of two securities. It could minimize confusion to the market 
participants. Issuance of treasury bills may as well play a role of benchmark rate for short-term market.  
Central bank bills for mid-term market will be absorbed and eventually integrated into treasury securities after 
the bond market is stabilized. It is essential to expand the size of the Treasury bond market at the time when foreign 
financial institutions increase the purchases of government. However, in this case, treasury securities instead of 
central bank bills should be secured for open market operations. In other words, the government issues sufficient 
amount of treasury securities for both budget shortage and monetary policy, and needs to deposit them into the 
central bank which can adjust the money supply by using repos that are collateralized with treasury bills. In some 
countries such as India and Macedonia, treasury securities are issued for monetary policy at the request of central 
bank. The sufficient supply of financial instruments for monetary policy is an important factor to integrate treasury 
securities. 
In summary, some countries issue either treasury bills or central bank bills for monetary policy and others issue 
two securities simultaneously. But, it proves that no advanced country issues two securities at the same time 
whereas most developing countries use both of the two securities. Advanced countries employ more treasury bills 
while the emerging market countries appear to use more central bank bills. In addition, the issuance of two bills 
leads to several problems. Therefore, this study suggests that the central bank bills in those countries where two bills 
are issued should be integrated into the treasury bills.  
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